Alexey Isaev calls himself the last humanist of the gallant age. He became a famous domestic historian, candidate of historical sciences. He maintains his blog "The Last Humanist of the Gallant Age" and opposes the genre of folk history.
Biography
The future author of books about the Great War Alexei Isaev was born in Tashkent on August 15, 1974. Graduated from the Cybernetics Faculty of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute. He was an employee of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
In 2012, having defended his dissertation, he became a candidate of historical sciences. Subsequently, he became the author of prefaces to memoirs, many books, articles in The Last Humanist of the Gallant Age and newspapers.
He got interested in history after watching the movie "Hot Snow" in his youth. Having met the Russian historian M. N. Svirin, he began working in the archive in the early 2000s. In 2001, he began writing books. From the very beginning Alexey Isaev wrote about the war. He became famous for his criticism of the theory of V. Suvorov. So there waslater famous book by Isaev Alexei Valerievich "Antisuvorov".
Books
In his works, the researcher prefers to cover the fighting that took place during the Second World War. So, the most famous books of Isaev Alexei Valerievich were studies about Georgy Zhukov. His most popular works are “June 22 - May 9. Great Patriotic War”, “Stalingrad. There is no land for us beyond the Volga”, “Main myths about World War II”, “Invasion. June 22, 1941 and many others.
About sources
It is noteworthy that in the study of history, Alexei Valerievich Isaev relies on many primary sources, which include both foreign and Russian archives. Thanks to this, he achieves objectivity and impartiality. In addition, sometimes the historian also publishes reviews of some works, emphasizing the absence or presence of historicity in them. It brings out many artistic exaggerations that many perceive as historical truth.
Historical research about the Second World War
Sometimes it seems that everything about the Second World War has already been told, and 76 years after the historic invasion, it is hardly possible to learn anything new. Nevertheless, a researcher of historical archives claims that much of what has been published is not true. So, the reasons for the defeat of the Soviet troops in the first days of the invasion of the Wehrmacht troops are absolutely erroneously indicated.
The generally accepted point of view is that the Soviet troops were defeated in the beginningmilitary operations due to the fact that the aircraft were destroyed by the enemy on the ground. This is often shown in movies. But in reality this is a myth. Soviet planes could not take off due to the fact that most of the takeoff fields were plowed up. Domestic aviation was destroyed not in an hour. It was destroyed within 3 days. The bases were identified in advance by the Germans and bombed them with precise strikes. There were a small number of airfields from which planes took off, giving a worthy rebuff, but the forces were not equal.
The fact is that in those days the reconstruction of airfields was necessary. And during the summer of 1941, it was planned to reconstruct many of them. As a result, in June, most of the runways were plowed up. In addition, the equipment and tankers were at the reconstructed bases. And the planes that managed to take off and return back did not have time to pour fuel into the tanks after the battles - they were bombed. Therefore, the stories that there were traitors in the leadership are a myth.
Reasons for reconstruction
It would seem illogical to start such a project before the war. But in May 1941, when it began, nothing foreshadowed trouble. There are widespread myths that intelligence officers warned Stalin many times that an attack on the USSR was being prepared. But in reality, no one had serious analytics. The Germans carefully concealed preparations for the invasion. The concentration of German troops in the east was explained as a defensive barrier before landing in England. And many formations advanced to the Soviet borders at the last moment. For these reasonsscouts did not identify serious threats. And a note from Comrade Tupikov from Berlin, sent in April, was lost in the general information flow. She talked about Germany's plans to attack the USSR, but the exact dates were not indicated there. It was noted that the attack would take place in the same year.
About the war scenario
If this information was taken more seriously, the reconstruction of airfields would have been postponed. And the war would have turned out differently. The forecast would have been more favorable for the USSR, and the war could have bogged down near the Dnieper. But what happened in the end is not the worst-case scenario for war. And much worse, according to Isaev, it would have been if the Soviet leadership had not taken immediate action.
About measures
In The Last Humanist of the Gallant Age, Isaev points out that the fact that Stalin stepped aside from command in the first days of the war is just a rumor. In the first hours he set to work hard. He took up the techniques of senior leadership in the military and industrial fields. At that moment, the most important decisions were made. So, it was decided to abandon the pre-war mobilization plan. The evacuation was started in advance.
New divisions were formed instantly. Thus, Panfilov's 316th division had been formed since July. It was calculated in advance that the German troops would reach Moscow at such a pace. But the city could not be lost, since it was the main transport hub of the country. And then they began to form the 300th and 400th divisions. If they had been created at least a month later, time would have been lost, and the fate of France would have awaited the country -a complete rout.
It is also a myth that many officers were repressed by the authorities, and if this had not been done, the forecast for the country would be more favorable. But Isaev claims that this is also a myth. So, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, only 4% of officers were arrested. And this had little effect on the combat capability of the army.
The outcome of the battles of the first days was a foregone conclusion, since on June 22, 1941, only 40 Soviet formations were combat-ready, and they were attacked by more than 100 fascist divisions. And any scenario would lead to the same outcome.
The intelligentsia's fiction is the opinion that fear of the NKVD forces forced the Soviet leadership to make many mistakes. The officers had no such fear. They sometimes completely ignored direct instructions given from above, doing what was necessary in specific circumstances in wartime conditions. They were people of a completely different core, and fear did not influence their decisions.
Alexey Isaev believes that the most dangerous myth is the opinion that the country's leadership abandoned the fighters, and the commanders betrayed the soldiers. In reality, everything was completely different.
About unknown heroes
Isaev notes that there are many heroic examples that have become unknown due to the fact that the Red Army soldiers who took part in the events eventually died. So, in the Vladimir-Volyn fortified area, the actions of the Red Army forced the Germans to generally change their original plans and the distribution of forces. The resistance here has been brokenonly on the morning of June 23. The Soviet fighters who fought here simply did not survive to report themselves, having fallen into the "Kyiv cauldron".
And in the description of the battle near Sokal, the Germans themselves described how the attack of just one Soviet bunker took about 3 hours. The Germans acknowledged that "the Russian soldiers offered outstanding resistance, surrendering only if they were wounded, for they fought to the last possible".
